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RICO VERSUS ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
PAUL COGGINS*

This paper will discuss the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)' statute in the United States, or more specifically, RICO versus organized
crime. An important focus of the paper will be on prosecutions in New York
because it has been the venue for many famous RICO prosecutions. RICO has been
used in criminal law for over 30 years. When RICO was first introduced, entire
seminars were devoted to it, and the general consensus was that RICO would
revolutionize criminal and civil enforcement. But RICO has not lived up to those
early predictions. Today, RICO is a rarely used tool in criminal prosecutions,
although it is often used in civil proceedings because it offers treble damages and
attorneys' fees. 2 RICO is used against hospitals, insurance companies, and banks.
While RICO is rarely used in criminal cases now, when the government employs it,

it has proven very effective.3 This paper will discuss some of the cases where RICO
has been used effectively in criminal prosecutions.
Generally, RICO was intended to do three things: (1)strengthen the tools for
gathering evidence; (2) establish new criminal penalties; and (3) provide new
remedies such as forfeiture and freezing of assets. In an effort to foster the goals of
RICO, many states also passed shadow legislation often called "Little RICO"

statutes.
* Paul E. Coggins, Esq. is a Principal of Fish & Richardson P.C., 5000 Bank One Center, 1717 Main St.,
Dallas, Texas 75214-3117. Telephone: 214-747-5070. Fax: 214-742-2091. E-mail: info@fr.com
Mr. Coggins is involved in public service organizations, including the Boards of the Greater Dallas
Crime commission, CASA (Court Appointed Special Advocates for Children), Dallas Country Historical
Foundation, and Vice Chair of "Target: Kids in Court" Steering Committee. He is also involved with the Family
Violence Prevention Council, Advisory Board of Dallas County Adult Literacy Council, the Patrick Higginbotham
Inn of Court, the Texas Bar Foundation, Co-Chairman of the Privacy & Computer Crime Committee for the ABA
Section of Science & Technology Law, and a co-founder of the Southwest Section of the ABA Committee on White
Collar Crime. He was a United States Attorney (Presidential appointee) for the Northern District of Texas, 19932001, and Assistant United States Attorney for the Northem District of Texas. 1980-1983. He is a published author
of numerous articles, including, Out ofBounds (co-authored with Congressman Tom McMillen, Simon & Schuster),
and The RegulatorsResponse to "'BankFraud": The United States' Perspective in Banks: Fraudand Crime, (coauthored chapter with Joseph E. Norton, Lloyds of London Press Ltd. 1994), the host of a weekend radio call-in
show, and a regular contributor to Texas Lawyer. He received his first B.A. from Yale University in 1973, and his
second B.A. from Oxford University in 1975. He was a Rhodes Scholar, and received his J.D. from Harvard Law
School in1978. He was admitted to the Texas Bar in 1978.
1. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964.
3. Two recent examples of people who ran afoul of RICO prosecutions are John Gotti, infamous mob boss,
and Edwin Edwards, the governor of Louisiana, illustrating the disparate types of folks who get charged.
4. At least thirty states have enacted Little
RICO or RICO-like statutes. These statutes are: Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 13-2312 to-2315 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Cal. Penal Code §§ 186-186.8 (West 1988 & Supp.1992); Colo.
Rev. Stat. §§ 18-17-101 to-109 (1986 & Supp. 1992); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-393 to-403 (West 1985 & Supp.
1992); Del. Code Ann. tit. I I §§ 1501-1511 (1987 & Supp. 1992); Fla.
Stat. Ann. §§ 895.01-.09 (West Supp. 1992);
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-14-1 to-15
(1992); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 842-1 to-12 (1985 & Supp. 1991); Idaho Code §§ 187801 to-7805 (1987 & Supp. 1992); l1. Ann. Stat. ch. 56V2, paras. 1651-1660 (1985 & Supp. 1992) (applies only
to "narcotics racketeering"); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 36-45-6-1 to-2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
15:1351-1356 (West Supp. 1992); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.901 -. 912 (West Supp. 1992); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-431 to-1I(Supp. 1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 207.350-.520 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1992); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:41I to 6.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-42-1 to-6 (Michie 1989); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 460.00-.80
(McKinney 1989); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75D-I to-I1 (1990); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 12.1-.06.1-01 to-08 (1985 & Supp.
1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2923.31-.36 (Anderson 1987 & Supp. 1991); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§1401-1419
(West Supp. 1992); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 166.715-.735 (1991); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 911 (1983 & Supp. 1992); R.I.
Gen. Laws §§ 7-15-1 to-I 1(1985); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-201 to-210 (1991 & Supp. 1989); Utah Code Ann.
176-10-1601 to-1609 (1990 & Supp. 1992); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 600-614 (Supp. 1992); Wash. Rev. Code

U.S.-MEXICO LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 11

RICO was originally passed to combat two major problems with the federal
government's campaign against organized crime. The first problem was insulation.
The people atop organized crime successfully insulated themselves from prosecution
by putting many layers between themselves and the guys who were actually
breaking legs, collecting loans, picking up prostitution money, etc.
The government's second problem with prosecuting organized crime was
fungibility, or replacements. Since the top guys were insulated, the foot soldiers,
who were easily replaceable, were the only ones being nabbed and put away. As
soon as the feds took out one group or crew, the top guys would simply bring on a
new crew to hit the streets.
Thus, RICO was devised to make it easier to prove liability of the people at the
top for the acts done by the people on the streets. RICO's purpose was to encourage
aggressive prosecution and to extend liability to the top of an organization, as well
as to allow the federal government to attack an entire enterprise as opposed to
merely picking off individuals.
The federal statute has largely succeeded. Wiretap information captures mobsters
themselves referring to the RICO statute by name. Indeed, there is a very famous
tape from a case prosecuted in 1985, where the boss states, "under RICO, no matter
who we are, what positions we have, if we're together, they'll get every one of us."'
This mobster offered a good summation of the law.
RICO is aimed at organized crime and not necessarily individual criminal acts.
Thus, the government must show a pattern of racketeering activity, as defined by
statute, by a criminal enterprise. The laundry list of crimes that can constitute
racketeering activity continues to grow. 6 The crimes prosecutors tend to rely on as
staples for RICO prosecution are mail fraud, wire fraud, financial institution fraud,
and other kinds of fraud. 7 These are the types of predicate activities that can form
racketeering activity for statutory purposes.
In addition to proving that the activity is considered racketeering, prosecutors
must also show a pattern of such activity. 8 A pattern has been defined to mean
continuity plus a relationship.9 The predicate acts must to be related to each other,
connected in some way, share a similar purpose, result, participants, victims,
methods, or commission, or other distinguishing characteristics, and must show
continuity. Basically, there must be at least two related predicate acts within a ten-

Ann. §§ 9A.82.001-.904 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 946.80-.87 (West Supp. 1992).
5.

United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 984-85 (1st Cir. 1987).

6. "Racketeering activity" is defined in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(I)(A)-(D) and includes "any act or threat
involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing

in a controlled substance or listed chemical."
7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1343-1344.
8. See 18 U.S.C.A. §1962(C).
9. See Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. at496,500-01 (1985) where the Supreme Court stated that

in order to constitute a RICO "pattern," the predicate acts must have "continuity plus relationship."
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year period by an enterprise.' 0 While an enterprise is defined to include non-legal
entities, a law firm or corporation could also be charged under a RICO statute."
In probably the most famous RICO case, called the Salerno Case or the
Commission Case, the entire criminal syndicate in New York City, known as La
Cosa Nostra and comprising the five families, was considered an association-infact.' 2 The families formed an enterprise. These families were tied together by a
in other federal substantive criminal
gloss on the RICO statute that is not present
3
statutes: a liberal construction clause.'
Even with the liberal construction clause and RICO's past successes, RICO is not
often used in criminal prosecutions because of its complexity. If a prosecutor
decides to indict under RICO, he or she must explain to a jury the definitions of
enterprise, association-in-fact, pattern, and racketeering activity. It is usually more
difficult to submit the numerous jury instructions defining these terms than it is
simply to charge a defendant with the predicate acts.
Another reason for RICO's passage was to stiffen penalties. The general penalty
under RICO is 20 years, unless the predicate act could lead to a life sentence, in
which case RICO contains a possible life sentence.' 4 The forfeiture provisions are
also extremely important, as are the freezing provisions, which allow courts to
freeze assets prior to the disposition of a case. 5 Of course, freezing assets may
impede a defendant's ability to pay defense counsel.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines determine how much time a convicted felon
will serve in prison and include the presence of organized crime elements in a
prosecution as grounds for an upward departure. 6 Under the Guidelines, defendants
are sentenced pursuant to a complex formula. Myriad factors play into the formula.
The formula in a particular case presents the judge with a range of potential
sentences (expressed in months). The vast majority of sentences imposed will fall
within that range.
Yet, judges sometimes sentence above or below that range. A judge may
upwardly depart from the range because of the presence of organized crime. A
judge may downwardly depart due to a defendant's providing substantial assistance
to the government. In fact, substantially assisting the government, or "ratting out"
colleagues, is the main way for a defendant to catch a break in the federal system.

10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5): "'pattern of racketeering activity' rcquires at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years
(excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of the prior act of racketeering activity."
18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4): "enterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."
fI. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). According to the
Supreme Court, "enterprise" connotes a group with a common purpose, with a continuity of personnel, and an
ongoing formal or informal organization.
12. See Brian Goodwin, Civil Versus CriminalRICO and the "Eradication" of La Cosa Nostra. 28 N.E.J.
on Crim. & Civ. Con. 279 (2002).

shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
13. Congress directed that the "provisions of this title
purposes," Pub.L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947, but the Supreme Court qualified that this clause was to be used
only to resolve ambiguity in the statute, 507 U.S at 183, 113 S.Ct. at 1172; Supreme Court affirmed this intent in
United States v. Turkette, supra n. 11.
14. 18 U.S.C.A. §1963.
15.

Id.

denied, 510 U.S. 1130 (1995).
16. See United States v.Rainone, 32 F.3d 1203, 1208-09 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
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The harsh penalties of statutes like RICO increase the pressure on defendants to
cooperate with the government.
As stated above, the most famous criminal case under RICO, the Salerno case,
took place under the leadership of then-United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, Rudy Giuliani. The Salerno Case involved a syndicate of five
families in New York called La Cosa Nostra."7 The indictment encompassed the
entire syndicate as an association-in-fact. Thus, the level of insulation between the
boss and the bottom rung of the family crumbled, and the boss became liable for
actions of other members of other families. The government pursued a strategy that
stretched liability to its limit.
That case proves that association-in-fact is a flexible term under RICO, and the
size of the conspiracy is really limited by two things: the imagination of the
prosecutor and the size of the courtroom. Ultimately, those are probably the only
factors that limit the RICO conspiracy. At trial the government presented evidence
that this syndicate, or association-in-fact, regulated businesses among the families.
The families promoted joint ventures when they needed to work together on a
project, and they resolved disputes, both boundary disputes and turf wars.
Although RICO also reached white-collar crimes by the families, some of the
predicate acts were hardly white-collar. For example, predicate acts included mob
murders, extortions, and a bombing.' As a result of the government's powerful
evidence, all defendants were convicted, and all but one defendant received a tripledigit sentence and a seven-figure fine. 9
The Salerno case pushed RICO liability to its boundary. The problem with such
a great success is that it led to premature declarations of victory, from the U.S.
President on down. In fact, Rudy Giuliani stated in 1986 that the Mafia would
"cease to be major threat within ten years."2 While Giuliani's prediction was overly
optimistic, it is hard to deny RICO's effectiveness when used properly.
Among cases that have recently been prosecuted, in May of 1996, the boss of the
Colombo crime family pled guilty to defrauding a Swiss and New Jersey-based
company of $1.2 million.2' In 1999, the Bonnano, Colombo and Genovese
organized crime families were all found to be involved in multiple stock
manipulation scams worth millions of dollars.22 In June of 1999, members of the
Bonnano and Gambino organized crime families were indicted in the largest
securities fraud case in US history.' In September of 2000, members of the
Lucchese organized crime family were charged with siphoning millions of dollars
from New York City's construction industry. 24 Finally, in December of 2001, 73
members of the Genovese family were arrested for racketeering activity accounting
for $14 million in illicit revenue.25 These cases demonstrate that RICO is alive and
well.

17. See United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1989).
1&. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-192.

19. See Goodwin at 303, supra n.11.
20. Id. at 320.
21. Id. at321.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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These cases also reveal two trends. First, all people in organized crime are
replaceable, even mob bosses. Second, some mob chiefs were fairly successful at
running their organizations from inside prison.
RICO has some drawbacks. The chief drawbacks are the complexity of the
statute, which makes it difficult for some juries to follow, and the danger of
overusing it. A statute that contains the word "racketeer" ought to be somewhat
limited in its use. The final problem is that, although the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines posit organized crime as a basis for an upward departure, arguably the
Guidelines have led to fewer, rather than more racketeering cases. Significantly, the
Guidelines are very harsh toward certain crimes, particularly drug offenses.
Therefore, even though many drug cartels could be charged under RICO, the drug
sentences are usually so onerous that it becomes unnecessary to use RICO for
additional leverage.
The crime families are not the only, or even chief, groups conducting organized
crimes. Traditional organized crime is dying and being replaced by new forms of
organized crime. The same activities typically associated with the familiar crime
families are being committed by other groups, including motorcycle gangs, youth
gangs, prison gangs, and as demonstrated on September 11, 2001, international
terrorist organizations. These evolving groups present a greater challenge to
prosecutors than the old-style families.
Organized crime preserits a greater challenge now than it did when RICO was
passed for two chief reasons. First, the days of making easy cases against organized
crime by tapping into phones and slipping agents undercover into meetings are
vestiges of the past. More and more often, organized crime communicates through
computers with powerful encryption. Thus, crime barons avoid meetings and phone
calls whenever possible. While dumb disorganized crooks will continue to be
caught by the old methods, more sophisticated organized crooks will not.
The second reason that RICO now faces greater challenges is the international
nature of criminal organizations. A recent case involving a huge international kiddie
porn organization that raked in tens of millions of dollars a year presents a good
example. The leaders of that organization never set foot in the United States. They
conducted their business over the internet, and they remained far from the United
States, operating from countries that do not extradite to the United States.
Consequently, international task forces are replacing the old state or regional task
forces in order to crack computer communications and combat new international
organizations. As organized crime continues to evolve, RICO must evolve as well.

